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Abstract
This paper looks at intergenerational welfare effects of increased
public debt when union power in pay bargaining generates
structural unemployment. Debt policy works through capital
accumulation as well as the price of a fixed asset that is owned by
the old generation. Under a reasonable condition, the debt burden
on future generations from postponement of the labor tax is larger
than in the case of no union power. Under this condition,
increased union power also reduces the consumption of future
generations.
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In many industrialized countries, structural fiscal deficits and growing unfunded social
security commitments have raised concerns about the long-run consequences for
intergenerational distribution and the political sustainability of the welfare state. A sizeable
literature has adopted the overlapping generations modeling framework to examine
intergenerational welfare effects of fiscal policy.
1 This literature has examined two channels
through which public debt and unfunded social security affect the intergenerational
distribution. The first channel of intergenerational effects works through capital accumulation,
and the second through price changes of assets traded among members of different
generations.
2
In this literature, the labor market is conventionally assumed to be perfectly
competitive. In many OECD countries, however – particularly in Europe where union
influence in wage bargaining is institutionalized
3 – rates of unemployment and public
spending on unemployment benefits are quite high. Moreover, as shown in Table 1, both
unemployment and net public debt have increased considerably from the 1970s to the 1990s.
4
This suggests that the burden on future generations of increased public debt and the economic
burden of high equilibrium unemployment could be interrelated and that the latter perhaps
aggravates the negative welfare effects for future generations. In order to focus on this
relationship, we analyze an overlapping generations (OLG) model of a small open unionized
                                                          
1 See for example Blanchard (1985), Persson (1985), Frenkel and Razin (1986), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987),
Kehoe (1987), Fried and Howitt (1988), Chang (1990), Auerbach  et al. (1991) and Buiter and Kletzer (1991).
2 The asset price effect plays a crucial role in Fried and Howitt (1988) and Laitner (2000). A related study with a
somewhat different focus is Chamley and Wright (1987).
3 According to Layard et al. (1991), in most European countries over three-quarters of the work force have
wages that are covered by collective bargaining.
4 In addition, implicit social security debt has increased quite a lot in most European countries during this period.
Generational accounting calculations reported by Raffelhüschen (1999) show that the intertemporal public
liabilities (IPL) as a percentage of GDP for 1995 was 127.4 percent on average for the four large countries in
Table 1 and 142.9 for the seven small countries. IPL measure how much additional wealth the government
would have needed today in order to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, assuming the present fiscal
policy applies to all future generations.  Although IPLs are subject to large measurement errors, they3
economy in which fiscal policy may affect the pay bargaining outcome and the rate of
structural unemployment.
5 Our framework is sufficiently rich to capture effects running from
unemployment and high public spending on unemployment benefits to public debt, as well as
effects of a high public debt on wage formation and structural unemployment. The latter
effects work through changes in wage taxes and unemployment benefits. When the life-cycle
saving motive is important, workers are on average younger than capital owners are.
Therefore, wage bargaining between trade unions of young workers and old capital owners
represents an additional channel of intergenerational redistribution.
6 Although there has been
a growing interest in trade union behavior in the context of OLG models, intergenerational
distribution effects of fiscal deficits have not received much attention in the literature so far.
7
In the next section, we present the model. Section 3 looks at the dynamic effects of
fiscal policy working through wage formation and structural unemployment in addition to the
capital accumulation and asset price channels. In section 4, we analyze the intergenerational
distribution effects of increased union power. The final section concludes.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nevertheless provide more unbiased estimates of the real excess fiscal burden on future generations inherent in
present fiscal policy by accounting for future population aging and old age related public spending.
5 We do not consider alternative models of unemployment such as search and efficiency wage models. For direct
evidence of the importance of union power and insider forces for wage determination in British industry, see
Nickell and Kong (1992).
6 As demonstrated by Devereux and Lockwood (1991), bargaining between unions and capital owners could
matter for intergenerational distribution even if full employment prevails.
7 Devereux and Lockwood (1991) and Croix and Licandro (1995) have looked at how trade union power changes
the incentives for capital accumulation.  An interesting simulation study by Jensen (1997) introduces wage
setting by monopoly unions in a computable OLG model of the Blanchard (1985) type to address the public debt
problem in Denmark.4
Table 1 Unemployment and net public debt in Europe (averages of percentage points)





b       4.2       8.2      9.4
Small countries
c       3.4       8.5      9.8
_____________________________________________________________
                           Net public debt
d
     1979     1989    1997
_____________________________________________________________
Large countries       28.8       36.6     60.0
Small countries       15.0       30.8     46.3
_____________________________________________________________
2. An overlapping generations model with a fixed asset
Our analytical framework is an OLG model of a small open one-sector economy. Domestic
output is an internationally traded good and is denoted Y. The real rate of interest is r > 0.
Assuming full international capital mobility, r is equal to the exogenous world real interest
rate. We extend previous work by Persson (1985), Eaton (1987) and Fried and Howitt (1988)
by introducing pay bargaining over the rents from a fixed factor and by considering structural
unemployment. We also extend their set of fiscal instruments and look at changes in profit
taxes and unemployment benefits in addition to a tax on labor.
8
In each time period t, there are two groups of households, the young and the old. There
is no population growth. The young households supply one unit of labor each, consume
                                                          
a Standardized rates, except for Austria and Denmark. Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Averages of country
data.
b Germany, France, Italy and United Kingdom.
c Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.
d General government net financial liabilities, per cent of nominal GDP, Averages of country data.5
output and save for retirement. The employed workers pay a labor tax τ , which comprises
labor income taxes as well as payroll taxes. Unemployed workers receive an after-tax
unemployment benefit b from the government.
9 The workers are also members of trade
unions engaged in wage bargaining with firms; see section 2.2 below. The old retired
households consume their capital income and accumulated wealth, leaving no bequest.
2.1. Production, consumption and wealth
There are three inputs, domestic labor Lt, reproducible capital Kt, and a fixed factor T. Kt is the
stock of capital at the beginning of period t and is measured in output units. Technology is
defined by an aggregate production function Yt = F(Lt, Kt, T), which exhibits constant returns
to scale. Firms pay a proportional profit tax σ  to the government, and maximize after-tax
profits, taking the bargained wage and the real interest rate as given. The real labor cost is
denoted wt. It is determined by wage bargaining between unions and firms. Profits (π t) are
, ) 1 ( T m rK L w Y t t t t t t = − − = π
where mt is the marginal product of the fixed factor T. In equilibrium, the marginal products
of Kt and Lt are equal to r and wt, respectively. The demand for labor is Lt = L(wt), with wage
elasticity − ε t, where ε t > 0, and π t = π (wt) is the profit function. The derivative of the latter is
− Lt. The output supply function is written as Y = Y(wt). It is also decreasing in w.
10 The
aggregate labor supply is normalized to 1. Unemployment is therefore 1 −  Lt.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8 To make the notation simple, we do not introduce implicit social security debt. Since there is no uncertainty,
implicit public debt have the same intergenerational effects as explicit net public debt.
9 Since there are no payroll tax on unemployment benefits, we assume that the tax rate is larger for the employed
than for the unemployed, see Nickell and Layard (1999).
10 We suppress the effect of r in L(w) and Y(w). Due to the fixed factor T, ε  depends on a complicated scale
effect in addition to the constant-output labor-demand elasticity. To see what is involved, suppose that F is
separable: Y = F(L,Q(K,T)), where Q(K,T) is linearly homogeneous. For given Y, the constant-output labor-
demand elasticity depends on the cost share of labor and on the elasticity of substitution between L and Q. This
effect has been studied extensively. Hamermesh (1993, p.93) concludes his review of the empirical literature by
suggesting that ”a reasonable confidence interval is [ 0.15, 0.75] .” The scale effect depends on the cost share of T
and on the substitution elasticity between K and T. It becomes large if the cost share of T becomes small. To6
The utility of an employed individual of generation t is U(ct, xt+1) −  l, where ct and xt+1
are consumption as young and old respectively, and l  > 0 is the disutility of work. Hence, U
is the utility function of an unemployed worker. We assume that l  is constant. Both goods are
normal goods. Letting yt = (1 −  τ t) wt be the after-tax wage income of an employed worker, his
budget constraint can be written as  ct + (1 + r)
− 1 xt+1 = yt. For an unemployed worker, yt is
replaced by the net unemployment benefit bt in the budget constraint. Constrained utility
maximization yields the consumption functions c(yt) and c(bt) for employed and unemployed
individuals, respectively.
11
National wealth at the beginning of period t is Wt and is measured in output units. It is
the sum of reproducible capital, the value of the fixed capital, and foreign assets, Wt*:
. ) 2 (
*
t t t t W T P K W + + =
The endogenous asset price at the beginning of period t is Pt. K, T and W* are perfect
substitutes in wealth portfolios. In equilibrium, the following arbitrage conditions must
therefore be fulfilled:
 . ,... 2 , 1 , ) ( ) 1 ( ) 3 ( 1 = = − + π σ − + t T rP T P P t t t t t
The LHS of (3) is the capital income from the ownership of T during period t. It must be equal
to the interest income from a corresponding investment in foreign assets. From (3), we derive
the asset price at the end of period t, Pt+1, as the present value of future after-tax profits:
T is then sold to generation t, which resells it to generation t + 1 for the price Pt+2 at the end of
period t + 1, and so on.
                                                                                                                                                                                    




















Behind the production function there is a fixed number of identical firms and unions engaged
in wage bargaining.
12 We adopt the Nash bargaining model; see Binmore et al. (1986) for a
strategic justification. Following Nickell and Layard (1999), we also assume that there will be
bargaining over the wage rate only, but not the level of employment, and that firms maximize
profits taking the bargained wage as given. This is consistent with the well-known stylized
fact that firms appear to set employment unilaterally, see for example Farber (1986) and
Oswald (1993).
We first consider the union objective. Various union welfare functions have been
suggested in the literature. One factor that often makes a difference is whether lay-offs are by
seniority or by random draw. In the theoretical literature on both labor unions and labor
contracts, the most common assumption is that layoffs are by random draw; see Oswald
(1993) for a survey. Since this assumption means that all members face the same probability
of becoming unemployed, the representative member of the union wants to trade off the
benefits of a high pay and job security. Therefore, the wage elasticity of the demand for labor
is important under such preferences.  Existing empirical evidence appears however to give
stronger support to the assumption of layoffs by seniority than to random layoffs, see Oswald
(1993). In this paper we consider both lay-off rules. The analytically simplest model is the
seniority model suggested by Oswald (1993). Let us first show the implications of this model
for wage determination before we look at the alternative assumption of lay-offs by random
draw.
In the seniority model the median voter is always employed and therefore only cares
about the pay. His utility is therefore the utility of an employed individual, U(ct, xt+1) −  l .
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Then  ε  = 1 + (w L / π ) = 6. Still, the constant-output labor-demand elasticity is only 1/3 in this case.
11 We have suppressed the dependence of c on the interest rate.
12 We do not consider nation-wide wage settlements. It is well known that centralization could matter for real
wages and aggregate employment, see for example Hoel (1991).8
Inserting the consumption functions, the indirect utility is written V(yt) - l , where as before,
yt = (1 −  τ ) wt. The derivative Vy is positive. Following Oswald (1993), the generalized Nash
objective can be written:




t w V y V l
In (5), V ˆ and πˆ  are the status quo or disagreement points and β  is the usual measure of union
power in wage determination, see Layard et al. (1991) and Nickell and Layard (1999). The
equilibrium wage is the wage that maximizes (5), subject to the firm choosing L to maximize
profits. This wage contract is efficient. Omitting time subscripts, the first-order condition can
be expressed as:
. ) 1 ( ,
ˆ ) ( ) 1 (
) ( ) 1 (
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It follows immediately that a higher β  leads to a higher w. In regard to the effects of fiscal
policy, it is easy to show that a sufficient condition for a positive wage cost effect of an
increase in τ , is first, that V(y) is isoelastic, and second, that the tax increase does not decrease
V ˆ + l by the same proportion as the decline in V(y), for a given w. It seems realistic to assume
that the utility of the median voter will be relatively less affected by an increase in the labor
tax (which includes payroll taxes) in a strike, say, than in his ordinary work. We therefore
assume that the effect of an increase in τ  on w is positive.
Considering next an increase in the profit tax rate σ . A standard assumption in the
literature is that the status equal point, πˆ , is zero, in which case a change in σ  has no effect on
w. The same is true if πˆ  is proportional to (1 - σ ). If πˆ  > 0, an increase in σ  will decrease w
because some of the tax burden is shifted on to the workers.
Finally, an increase in the net unemployment benefit b will only have an effect on the
wage bargain if the status quo point V ˆ increases. In the present framework, the median voter9
does not risk to be unemployed, but this assumption may be too restrictive in a
macroeconomic context. We return to this question below.
Next we look at the alternative union model, in which lay-offs are by random draw.
Now the representative union member has the following preferences:
()() ( ) . ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) 7 ( A w L A y V w L A w L y V V
draw + − − = − + − = l l
A represents outside opportunities and is exogenous in the wage bargain. It is the expected
utility that the member will obtain if he is not employed by the firm. Following Nickell and
Layard (1999), we express A as the weighted average of the utility as unemployed and the
utility of working in an alternative job:
() . ) ) 1 (( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 8 ( l − τ − − + = w V u b V u A  
In (8), u  is the aggregate unemployment rate and w is the average wage cost in the
economy.
13 Letting A also be the status quo point of the union, the Nash objective becomes




Substituting from (7), we obtain the following first-order condition for a maximum:
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There are two main differences from the first-order condition (6) in the seniority model. One
difference is the second term in (10), which reflects that this union cares about the elasticity of
the demand for labor. And second, A is not exogenous at the macroeconomic level; see (8). In
equilibrium, w = w  and 1 −  L(w) = u . Using (8), we can therefore close the model by
expressing the denominator of the first term in (10) as:
() ( ) . ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) 11 ( b V y V w L A y V − − − = − − l l
                                                          
13 Nickell and Layard (1999) assume that the probability of becoming unemployed is also a function of
exogenous parameters affecting the separation rate out of employment and the search effectiveness of the
unemployed.10
The comparative static effects are derived in Section A1 of the Appendix.  In regard to the
effects of changes in τ , β  and σ , we obtain the same qualitative effects as in the seniority
model discussed above. A difference, though, is the effect of an increase in net unemployment
benefits (b), which increases the wage in the present model. Such an effect is consistent with
most empirical evidence; see for example, Layard et al. (1991).
On the basis of the union models, we obtain the following wage function:
). , , , ( ) 12 (
) ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) ( + + +
β σ τ = b w w
The signs of the partial derivatives of the wage function are shown beneath the arguments in
(12). The effects of an increase in the labor income tax (wτ ), unemployment benefit (wb) and
union power (wβ ) on the bargained wage are positive, and the effect of an increased profits tax
(wσ ) is zero. We also assume that yτ , the partial derivative of after-tax income y with respect
to τ , is negative:
. 0 ) 1 ( ) 13 ( < τ − + − = τ τ w w y
 The precise condition under which this assumption holds is given in the Appendix.
2.3 Income, saving and government debt
Letting Bt be the net public debt at the beginning of period t, the budget constraint of the
government is
() ). ( ) ( 1 ) ( , ) 1 ( ) 14 ( 1 t t t t t t t t t t t w b w L w L w Z Z B r B π σ τ + − − = − + = +
 Zt is net tax revenues. Using the wage function (12), Zt can be written as a function of fiscal
instruments and union power (β ):
() ). , , , ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) 15 ( β σ τ ≡ π σ + − − τ = t t t t t t t t t t t b Z w b w L w L w Z
The effect of an increase in σ  is positive: Zσ   = π  > 0. This is the only partial derivative in (15)
that has an unambiguous sign. Omitting time subscripts, the effect of an increase in β  on Z is:11
() . ) (
) (
1 ) ( ) 16 ( β β
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This effect works through the wage effect on net tax revenues. It is clearly negative if ε  ≥  1. If
ε  is sufficiently small, however, Zβ  > 0. A necessary and sufficient condition for Zβ  < 0 is:










In what follows, we will assume that (17) is always fulfilled. Therefore, Zβ  < 0. Due to the
scale effect underlying ε , this assumption seems quite reasonable; see footnote 10. Given (17),
it immediately follows that Zb < 0.
The effect of an increase in τ  on Z is crucial for our analysis of debt policy. Omitting
time subscripts, this effect is
() . 0 , ) (
) (
1 ) ( ) ( ) 18 ( wL Z w w L
w
b w
w w wL Z < < 


 + + − − = τ τ τ
ε
σ τ ε
From (16), we recognize that the last term in (18) is the effect operating through the increase
in w, which was assumed to be negative, see (17). Therefore, Zτ  < wL. On the other hand, if ε
is sufficiently large, Zτ  is negative. In other words, we cannot in general exclude a “Laffer”
effect if the labor demand is very elastic and the wτ  effect is strong. However, to focus on
empirically interesting results, we assume that Zτ   > 0. To summarize: ). , , , (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( − + − + = β σ τ b Z Z
Another variable that turns out to be important for our analysis of debt policy is Rt, the
total after-tax income of the young generation t, i.e. the sum of the incomes of the employed
and unemployed individuals. Using the wage function (12), and omitting time subscripts, we
can express R as a function of the fiscal instruments and union power in the same period:
() . ) , , , ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) 19 (
(?) ) 0 ( (?) ) ( β σ τ b R b w L y w L R
− = − + =12
For familiar reasons, Rσ  = 0. The signs of Rb and Rβ  are both ambiguous because we do not
know the sign of the wage effect on R.
14 Let us look at the effect of an increase in τ  on R:
() . 0 ) 20 ( < 







b y y R
This effect is clearly negative: First, the effect on y is negative, and second, those who
become unemployed face an income reduction. It is useful to show the relation between net
tax revenues (Zt) and Rt:
. ) 21 ( t t t t t t Z L w R π σ + − =
Note that since the young do not pay the profit tax and the latter is included in Z, we must add
the profit tax revenues in (21). Differentiating (21) with respect to τ , using (15) and (19), and
omitting time subscripts, we obtain the following identity:
. ) ( ) 1 ( ) 22 ( τ τ τ σ ε w w L Z R − − + − ≡
This identity is important for our analysis of the burden of the public debt.
Total private saving of the young is denoted St. It is equal to the sum of the savings of
the employed and the unemployed. Using (13) and (19), we obtain:
() ). , , , ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) 23 (
(?) ) 0 ( (?) ) (
β σ τ ≡ − − − =
−
b S b c w L y c w L R S
The properties of (23) are straightforward to derive. For the usual reason, Sσ  = 0. Moreover, Sτ
< 0 because a higher τ  increases unemployment and reduces y. The sign of Sb is ambiguous
since the induced wage increase reduces employment: Those who lose their jobs save less,
counteracting the increase in saving by those who keep their jobs or are unemployed at the
                                                          
14 It is easy to show that if ε  < y / (y −  b), an increase in w leads to a higher R. In this case Rb > 0 and Rβ  > 0.
These effects could be turned around by high labor demand elasticity, however.13
outset. 
15 Finally, increased β  has an ambiguous effect on S because a higher wage increases
the saving of the employed and reduces the saving of those who lose their jobs.
St is equal to the aggregate private wealth at the beginning of period t + 1: St = Wt+1 +
Bt+1. Using (14), (15) and (23), we can therefore express national wealth as a function of the
fiscal policy in the preceding period:
() () . , , , ) 1 ( , , , ) 24 ( 1 β σ τ β σ τ t t t t t t t t b Z B r b S W + + − = +
The consumption of the old generation in period t can be expressed as:
() ( ) () ( ) ( ). 1 , , , 1 ) 25 (
*
1 t t t t t t t t t B W K r T P b w x + + + + + − = + β σ τ π σ
An important feature of this model is that an unanticipated increase in τ t or bt reduces profits,
which reduce xt.
3. Effects of fiscal policy
All our policy experiments assume that the economy is initially in a steady state, and that a
change in fiscal policy in period t involves an unexpected increase in Bt+1. From period t + 1
and onwards, one tax or transfer instrument is used to stabilize the debt at its new higher level.
Since there are no bequests, and r is constant, a new steady state will be attained from period t
+ 2 and onwards, Then generation t has vanished, and all subsequent generations behave in
the same way. The asset price Pt+1, will normally change in response to the change in policy,
but from then on it will be constant. We first look at the steady state effects, and then we will
analyze the effects of the policies on the two generations living in period t.
3.1. Steady state effects
Since there is no population growth, r B = Z and W = S −  Z / r in steady state. An increase in B
will therefore require a higher τ  or σ , a cut in b. From (4), we see that if w and π  are constant,
we obtain the following asset price:
                                                          








 Let C denote aggregate consumption in any given period:
() . ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 27 ( x w L b c w L y c C + − + =
The consumption of the young generation is therefore C −  x. Moreover, x = (1 + r) S. Using
the fact that the young’s consumption can be expressed as R – S, C = R + r S. Hence:
). , , , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( ) 28 (
(?) ) 0 ( (?) ) ( (?) ) 0 ( (?) ) ( (?) ) 0 ( (?) ) (
β σ τ ≡ β σ τ + β σ τ =
− − −
b C b rS b R C
From the partial derivatives, we see that debt service through increased τ  reduces C since both
R and S decline. The corresponding effect of a cut in b cannot be signed unambiguously,
however. If ε  is large, the positive employment effect could dominate and increase C even
though both y and b fall. If the increase in B is serviced by raising the profit tax, this will not
affect C. Table 2 summarizes the steady state effects of a permanent increase in B, depending
on the fiscal instrument used to service the debt. The comparative-static effects are
straightforward to derive.
Table 2 Long-run effects of increased public debt
Effect on:
 Debt w      π       Y   S      R       P     W     C     Union
 service:      welfare
a
_________________________________________________________
Increase in τ +      −       −        −       −       −    −        −        −
Decrease in b  −       +      +       ?      ?       +    ?       ?        −
Increase in σ 0       0      0       0      0       −     −       0       0
_______________________________________________________
a The random layoff model.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1995). Such effects are not captured by the present model, which only focuses on life-cycle saving.15
For example, the qualitative effects on union welfare basically follow from the fact
that it is increasing in w in both union models. We can therefore conclude that steady state
union welfare falls if the increased debt is serviced by an increase in τ  or decrease in b, and
does not change if σ  is increased.
16
It is also worth noticing that a Ricardian equivalence result follows from increased
public debt through postponement of profit taxation; see line 1 in Table 2. Although P and W
fall permanently, this fiscal policy has no real effects as long as the wage effect of a change in
σ  is zero.
17 To summarize:
PROPOSITION 1. If future wage income taxes are increased to service the public debt,
steady state employment, output, national wealth, asset price, aggregate consumption and
union welfare decline. If future unemployment benefits are reduced, steady state union
welfare declines, and employment, output and the asset price increase. If future profit taxes
are increased, the asset price and national wealth decline. This policy has no effects on steady
state employment, output, consumption and union welfare.
Let us now take a closer look at the burden of increased debt on future generations if it
is serviced by increased τ . We differentiate (28), using that r B = Z and dτ  = r dB / Zτ :
() () . ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 29 ( 


 − + − + − − + = −
w
w










In (29), Sy = (y – c(y))L is the saving of the employed and Sb = (b – c(b))(1 – L) is the saving
of the unemployed. It is instructive to compare this positive expression with the effect of
increased B if there is no change in w. Then wτ  = 0, Zτ  = w L, yτ  = − w, and (29) simplifies to
                                                          
16 There is no simple relation between union welfare and C in steady state. For example, a decrease in b lowers
union welfare, but we cannot exclude that C increases. The main reason is that the union welfare function also
includes leisure.
17 The welfare of the first old generation does not change because the gain from the short run fall in the profit tax
is equal to the present value of the future increase in profit taxes. This is an example of the danger of ”deficit
delusion”: Creation of new public debt does not necessarily have an effect on the intergenerational distribution.
For more examples, see Kotlikoff (2001).16
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We refer to this case at the full employment case, and C
f stands for aggregate consumption
under full employment (L = 1). Since 1- cy is positive, the decline in C is greater than r dB
because future generations save less as young due to their lower after-tax wage income,
reducing the steady state capital income.
18
Comparing (29) and (30), we cannot in general exclude the possibility that the debt
burden is smaller under unemployment than under full employment. We observe that the last
term in (29) is new. This term adds to the burden of the public debt because those who
become unemployed cut their consumption. The term consists of two elements, the income
differences between the employed and unemployed, (y - b) and r (S
y - S
b). The latter term
represents the reduction in consumption as old due to lower first-period saving by the
unemployed. A second difference between (29) and (30) relates to the first term in (29):





y − − +
If (-yτ ) L / Zτ  > 1, and the marginal propensities to save are the same, the real burden of the
debt under unemployment must clearly be larger than under full employment. We cannot
exclude, however, that the sum of the two terms in (29) is smaller than the single term in (30).
To see more clearly what is involved, let us consider the special case of homothetic
utility. Then the employed and unemployed have the same rate of saving. Let s denote the
common rate of saving. Now S = s R and from (28), C =  (1 + r s) R. Therefore, (29)
simplifies to









                                                          
18 This result also follows from the models of Persson (1985) and Fried and Howitt (1988). Persson showed that
-dW*/dB = 1 + r (1– cy), which also comes out of the present model. Net foreign assets (W*) decrease by more
than the increase in B because the saving of the young declines.17
Comparing (31) and (30), we see that the debt burden is larger under unemployment than
under full employment if and only if -Rτ  > Zτ . Using (22), this condition is equivalent to
. 1 ) 32 ( > + σ ε
Moreover, -Rτ  = Zτ  if and only if ε  + σ  = 1. We have thus proved:
PROPOSITION 2. If utility is homothetic, the burden on future generations of public debt
serviced by an increase in τ  is larger the corresponding burden under full employment if and
only if ε  + σ  > 1. The debt burdens are equal if and only if ε  + σ  = 1.
The key to understanding this result is equation (21): -R = Z – (w L + σ  π ). If the burden of
the debt is largest under unemployment, the decline in R resulting from the increase in τ  must
be larger than the increase in Z, see (31). Therefore, ε  + σ  > 1. An elastic labor demand is
sufficient for this condition to hold because if ε  > 1, the tax-induced wage increase will then
reduce wL in (21). This has a negative effect on R in addition to the effect running through Z.
The profit tax rate enters condition (32) because profit taxes do not affect R, the disposable
income of the young, only Z. When w goes up due to the increase in τ , profit tax revenues
decline, decreasing Z without affecting R.
3.2. Dynamic effects
Let us now consider the effects on generation t −   1 and t when the public debt is increased in
various ways in period t. We first prove the following result:
PROPOSITION 3. When the same fiscal instrument is used to create and service the debt, an
unanticipated increase in B does not affect the consumption of the first old generation.
The proof is shown in the Appendix. This result means that even though an unanticipated debt
policy changes profits in the same period as the debt is created, the present value of future
profits changes in the opposite direction if the same fiscal instrument is used to service the18
debt in all future periods. The first old generation is therefore not affected after all. Table 3
presents the intergenerational welfare effects of various debt policies.
Table 3 Welfare effects of debt policies under pay bargaining
First old          First young                 Future
generation       generation               generations
_______________________________________________________________________
Debt policy Consump-   Union   Consump-    Union   Aggr. con-
    tion        welfare
a     tion         welfare
a   sumption
_______________________________________________________________________
Postponement of labor income
taxation (τ )        0   +    +                 −     −
Postponement of profit taxation (σ )        0               0    0                 0                0
Increasing unemployment benefits (bt),
reducing future b         0   +     ?            −      ?
A temporary cut in τ , increasing
future σ            ?    +     +            0        0
A temporary increase in b, increasing        −    +            ?                0                 0
future σ
___________________________________________________________________________
a The random layoff model.
First we look at the effects of a postponement of labor taxation. The qualitative effects
are the same as in a full employment model in which w does not change. Due to Proposition
3, the first old generation is not affected even though P declines permanently. This is because
present profits increase due to wτ  > 0. The present young generation gains and all subsequent
generations lose both in terms of aggregate consumption and union welfare; see Table 3, the
first row. The new steady state is attained from period t + 2 and onwards, when generation t
has left the economy. The policy increases employment and output in period t, but reduces
future employment and output permanently (Proposition 1).19
The second row in Table 3 confirms the Ricardian equivalence result from
postponement of profit taxation that was mentioned in the previous section.
If the government creates new debt by increasing bt, the first old generation is not
affected if future benefits are cut to service the debt (Proposition 3). L(w) and Y(w) fall in
period t and increase in all future periods, but union welfare changes in the opposite direction.
Future aggregate consumption could increase or decrease, see Table 3, the third row.
Next we look at a debt policy involving a cut in τ t and increased future profit taxes to
service the debt. This case is interesting because the debt burden is not shifted on to future
generations. In the present setting, this policy involves
 dτ t = − dB / Zτ  < 0 and dσ t+j = dσ  = (r /π ) dB > 0.
The tax cut decreases wt and increases yt. Therefore employment, output, profits, the young’s
income and union welfare increase in period t. A fall in P is the only permanent effect of the
policy. This is due to a higher future tax on profits, but does not involve any real effects on
future consumption, employment or output. As before, the incidence of all future profit taxes
is on the first old generation. To calculate the effect on xt, we utilize that T dPt = − (π  / r) dσ   =
− dB and dτ t = − dB / Zτ . Differentiation of (25) yields:
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The term inside the square brackets is clearly positive. Due to the first negative term,
however, the sign of (33) cannot be determined unambiguously, see Table 3, row 4. If wτ  is
large, the total effect could be positive, leading to an increase in the welfare of generation t −
1 as well. In this case the debt policy involves a Pareto improvement.
19 If the total effect is
negative, the burden of the debt is shifted on to the old asset-holding generation. In any case,
                                                          
19 Recalling that the profit tax is neutral, it is not surprising that a swap from taxation of labor income to profits
could lead to a Pareto improvement.20
future generations are not affected by the policy even though σ  increases permanently. The
latter result clearly hinges critically on the neutrality of the profit tax.
Finally we note that if the debt is created by a temporary increase in bt, employment
and profits decline, reducing xt, see Table 3, row 5. In this case, the debt is again shifted
backwards from the young and to the old generation. We have thus shown:
PROPOSITION 4. If B increases due to a temporary cut inτ  and σ  is increased permanently
to service the debt, the first young generation consumes more without affecting C. The sign of
the effect on x is indeterminate. If the debt is created by a temporary increase in b, the first
young generation consumes more at the expense of the first old generation, not future
generations.
4. Increased bargaining power of unions
We now consider the effects of a permanent (and unanticipated) increase in the bargaining
power of unions (β ) in period t. Since wβ  > 0, this will move the wage upwards along the
demand for labor schedule and reduce employment, output and profits. From (15) we see that
net tax revenues decline. Sooner or later, a fiscal policy restraint must therefore take place to
fulfil the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. To avoid mixing the result with
those of a permanent increase in public debt, we assume that the fiscal restraint is already
taking place in period t such that that Zt and Bt+1 do not change. Suppose that τ  is increased at
once to keep Z and B constant at their initial levels. A new steady state is therefore established
after one period. Differentiating (15), and setting dZ = 0, the necessary permanent increase in
τ  is
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The labor tax must increase since Zβ  < 0 and Zτ  > 0; see (16) and (18). We also note that the
condition for Zβ  < 0 is exactly the same as the condition for Zτ  < w L. The tax increase will
have an additional positive effect on w, reducing employment, output and profits further. The
first old generation definitely loses due to lower present and future profits. The sign of the
steady state effect of increased β  on union welfare is ambiguous: The direct effect is positive,
but the indirect effect working through a higherτ  is negative. The effect on C could go either
way as well. In order to derive a condition under which C declines, we look at the special case
of homothetic utility to abstract from aggregate demand effects of the induced change in the
income distribution between employed and unemployed workers. As shown previously,
() , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 35 ( σπ + + − + = + = wL Z rs R rs C
see (21). As before, s is the rate of saving of the young. Differentiating C with respect to β ,
using (34) and the derivative  , β β
τ
τ β w w d
d
d
dw + = yields:
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It follows that the sign of this effect depends critically on the sign of (1 −  ε  −  σ  ). The sign of
this expression was also critical for deciding whether the burden of the public debt was larger
or smaller than the debt burden in the case of full employment (Proposition 2). Let us now
look at the effects of increased union power if the other fiscal instruments are used to keep Z
and B constant. We then obtain the following effects:
. 0 ,
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Again we see that although the effects differ, their signs critically depend on the sign of
(1 - ε  - σ ). We have therefore proved the following result:22
PROPOSITION 5. In the case of homothetic utility, an unexpected increase in β  -- followed
by a fiscal restraint stabilizing Z and B – reduces C in steady state if and only if  ε   + σ   > 1.
The effect on C is zero if and only if ε   + σ   = 1. These conditions are invariant to the fiscal
instrument used to stabilize Z and B.
To understand this result, we see from (35) that since Z does not change, the effect on C
works through the change in the term (w L(w) + σ  π (w)), the derivative of which is
(1 - ε  - σ ) L. Therefore, the sign of this derivative is crucial for the sign of the effect of an
increase in β  on C, independently of the fiscal instrument used to keep Z and B constant. It
was the same derivative that was decisive for the comparison of the sizes of the debt burdens
under unemployment and full employment (Proposition 2). The latter question was shown to
depend on the sign of the sum Rτ  + Zτ , which again hinges on the sign of  (1 - ε  - σ ); see (22).
5. Conclusions
This paper has looked at intergenerational distribution effects of public debt when union
power in pay bargaining generates structural unemployment in a small open economy.
Changes in fiscal policy affect capital accumulation as well as the price of a fixed asset, which
the old generation sells to the young. This asset price channel of intergenerational distribution
effects is important in the present model because changes in wage income taxes and
unemployment benefits affect the wage bargaining outcome.
20 This changes present and
future profits that are capitalized in the asset price. The debt policies consist of two elements.
First, in period t, the public debt is created by a temporary tax cut or spending increase. And
then, from period t + 1 and onwards, fiscal policy is tightened sufficiently to stabilize the new
                                                          
20 It is therefore not unions and structural unemployment per ce that matter, but rather the impacts of wage taxes
and unemployment benefits on wage setting. For a simulation study of the effects of tax cuts in four different
models, including search equilibrium and efficiency wage models, see Pissarides (1998). He concludes that the
models generate broadly similar results: “But if the unemployment benefits are not indexed to wages (and held
fixed in real terms), the employment effects of tax cuts can be sizeable.” (pp. 178).23
debt over time. The intergenerational effects of debt policy are sensitive to whether future
debt service payments are financed by increased taxes on labor or profits. Future labor income
taxes hurt future generations, but changes in future profit taxes only affect the welfare of the
old wealth owners (generation t −  1). We showed that postponement of labor taxation
redistributes consumption from future generations to the present young generation t, without
changing the consumption of the first old generation, a result that is qualitatively similar to
the corresponding effects in a model with full employment. Even if future employment and
output fall due to the effect of increased wage income tax on the pay bargain, the debt burden
on future generations is not always reinforced by future unemployment. We derived a simple
condition under which the debt burden on future generations is reinforced by future
unemployment, using the debt burden under full employment as a benchmark. This condition
says that the sum of the profit tax rate and the wage elasticity of labor demand must be greater
than one. If this sum is smaller than one, however, the favorable effect of the induced wage
increase on the wage income tax base reduces the future burden of the debt compared to the
full employment case. In contrast, a postponement of profit taxation has no real effects since
the incidence of the present value of current and future profit taxes is on the old generation.
Therefore, if the debt is increased by a temporary tax cut on labor income, and future profit
taxes are increased to service the debt, the young generation gains at the expense of the first
old generation. Hence, the burden of the debt is shifted backward to the first old generations,
not forwards on future generations.
We also examined the effects of an unanticipated increase in the bargaining power of
unions. The first old generation must lose due to a fall in current profits and the asset price.
We showed that although increased union bargaining power depresses output permanently,
the sign of the steady state effect on aggregate consumption is ambiguous. If the sum of the
profit tax rate and the wage elasticity of labor demand is greater than one, however, future24
aggregate consumption must decline. Therefore, the condition that causes an increase in union
power to reduce future aggregate consumption is identical to the condition that leads to a
larger public debt burden under unemployment than under full employment.
Appendix A1. The wage function
To derive the effect a marginal increase in τ  on w in the union model in which lay-offs are by
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As before, y = (1 −  τ ) w and ε (w) = -Lww / L. We note that since µ(w) is defined as the ratio of
profits to labor cost, the first term on the RHS of (A1) is constant if the production function is
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In (A2), Γ (L(w)) ≡  L(w) / (1 −  L(w)) is a decreasing function of w. The two other functions,
Φ (w) and Ψ (y) are defined as follows:
()
, ) ( ,
) ( ) ( 1
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) (
1 ) ( 1




















µ + ε −
≡ Φ













yy y − − ≡
−
≡ θ + − θ ≡ Ψ l
The Φ (w) function reflects how the first term on the RHS of (A1), ε   + (1 / β  µ) reacts to a
change in w. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, ε  = 1 + (1 / µ) = γ −  1. Then we see
from (A3) that Φ  = 0. If θ (y) > 1, Ψ (y) > 0.  In fact, it is easy to show that Ψ (y) > 0 if V(y) is25
isoelastic (θ constant), including the linear case (θ = 0).  The following conditions are
necessary and sufficient for wτ  > 0 in the wage function (12):
. 0 )) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , 0 ) ( ) 5 ( > Γ ε + Φ + Ψ > Ψ w L w w y y A
As we have seen, these are quite weak conditions that require large departures from isoelastic
utility (as well as θ (y) < 1) to be violated. We also see from (A1) that if
Φ (w) + ε (w) Γ (L(w)) = 0,
dy / dτ  ≡  yτ  = 0. In this special case, the union is able to prevent y from declining. We also
exclude this possibility, and assume yτ  < 0. Hence
. 0 )) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) 6 ( > Γ ε + Φ w L w w A
In regard to the effect on w of a marginal increase in b, a sufficient condition for wb > 0 is
(A6). As to wβ , it follows immediately from (9) wβ  > 0. Moreover, wσ   = 0.
Appendix A2. Proof of Proposition 3
Anticipated consumption of generation t − 1 is x
a
t = (1 + r)( Pt T + Kt + W*t + Bt), i.e. it
depends on Pt, which is equal to the anticipated present value of after-tax profits at the end of
period t −  1 (see (4)). Therefore it suffices to show that the debt policy does not affect the
latter. The result is obvious in the case of postponement of profit taxation because wσ  = 0.
Consider a postponement of wage income taxation, i.e. dB = − Zτ  dτ t, (dτ t < 0), and
dτ t+j = r dB / Zτ  for j =  1,2,3… Hence, dτ t+j =  − r dτ t. The effects on present and future profits
are dπ t = L wτ  dB / Zτ  and dπ t+j = − r L wτ  dB / Zτ  (j = 1,2,3,…). Since Pt can be expressed as
,
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it follows that the present value of after-tax profits does not change. Hence, xt does not
change. A similar argument proves that xt does not change if b is used to create and service
the debt. g
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